THE RISE OF HISTORICAL CRITICISM
3. CHAPTER III
(continued)
Now, in entire opposition to this modern inductive principle of
research stands the philosophic Plato, whose account of primitive
man is entirely speculative and deductive.
The origin of society he ascribes to necessity, the mother of all
inventions, and imagines that individual man began deliberately to
herd together on account of the advantages of the principle of
division of labour and the rendering of mutual need.
It must, however, be borne in mind that Plato's object in this
whole passage in the Republic was, perhaps, not so much to analyse
the conditions of early society as to illustrate the importance of
the division of labour, the shibboleth of his political economy, by
showing what a powerful factor it must have been in the most
primitive as well as in the most complex states of society; just as
in the Laws he almost rewrites entirely the history of the
Peloponnesus in order to prove the necessity of a balance of power.
He surely, I mean, must have recognised himself how essentially
incomplete his theory was in taking no account of the origin of
family life, the position and influence of women, and other social
questions, as well as in disregarding those deeper motives of
religion, which are such important factors in early civilisation,
and whose influence Aristotle seems to have clearly apprehended,
when he says that the aim of primitive society was not merely life
but the higher life, and that in the origin of society utility is
not the sole motive, but that there is something spiritual in it
if, at least, 'spiritual' will bring out the meaning of that
complex expression [Greek text which cannot be reproduced].
Otherwise, the whole account in the Republic of primitive man will
always remain as a warning against the intrusion of a priori
speculations in the domain appropriate to induction.
Now, Aristotle's theory of the origin of society, like his
philosophy of ethics, rests ultimately on the principle of final
causes, not in the theological meaning of an aim or tendency
imposed from without, but in the scientific sense of function
corresponding to organ. 'Nature maketh no thing in vain' is the
text of Aristotle in this as in other inquiries. Man being the
only animal possessed of the power of rational speech is, he
asserts, by nature intended to be social, more so than the bee or
any other gregarious animal.
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