BOOK II
1. CHAPTER I
Since then we propose to inquire what civil society is of all others
best for those who have it in their power to live entirely as they
wish, it is necessary to examine into the polity of those states which
are allowed to be well governed; and if there should be any others
which some persons have described, and which appear properly
regulated, to note what is right and useful in them; and when we point
out wherein they have failed, let not this be imputed to an
affectation of wisdom, for it is because there are great defects in
all those which are already 'established, that I have been induced to
undertake this work. We will begin with that part of the subject which
naturally presents itself first to our consideration. The members of
every state must of necessity have all things in common, or some
things common, and not others, or nothing at all common. To have
nothing in common is evidently impossible, for society itself is one
species of [1261a] community; and the first thing necessary thereunto
is a common place of habitation, namely the city, which must be one,
and this every citizen must have a share in. But in a government which
is to be well founded, will it be best to admit of a community in
everything which is capable thereof, or only in some particulars, but
in others not? for it is possible that the citizens may have their
wives, and children, and goods in common, as in Plato's Commonwealth;
for in that Socrates affirms that all these particulars ought to be
so. Which then shall we prefer? the custom which is already
established, or the laws which are proposed in that treatise?
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