APPENDIX
81. NOTES ON "THUS SPAKE ZARATHUSTRA" BY ANTHONY M. LUDOVICI. (continued)
In verses 15 and 16, we have Nietzsche declaring himself an evolutionist in
the broadest sense--that is to say, that he believes in the Development
Hypothesis as the description of the process by which species have
originated. Now, to understand his position correctly we must show his
relationship to the two greatest of modern evolutionists--Darwin and
Spencer. As a philosopher, however, Nietzsche does not stand or fall by
his objections to the Darwinian or Spencerian cosmogony. He never laid
claim to a very profound knowledge of biology, and his criticism is far
more valuable as the attitude of a fresh mind than as that of a specialist
towards the question. Moreover, in his objections many difficulties are
raised which are not settled by an appeal to either of the men above
mentioned. We have given Nietzsche's definition of life in the Note on
Chapter LVI., par. 10. Still, there remains a hope that Darwin and
Nietzsche may some day become reconciled by a new description of the
processes by which varieties occur. The appearance of varieties among
animals and of "sporting plants" in the vegetable kingdom, is still
shrouded in mystery, and the question whether this is not precisely the
ground on which Darwin and Nietzsche will meet, is an interesting one. The
former says in his "Origin of Species", concerning the causes of
variability: "...there are two factors, namely, the nature of the
organism, and the nature of the conditions. THE FORMER SEEMS TO BE MUCH
THE MORE IMPORTANT (The italics are mine.), for nearly similar variations
sometimes arise under, as far as we can judge, dissimilar conditions; and
on the other hand, dissimilar variations arise under conditions which
appear to be nearly uniform." Nietzsche, recognising this same truth,
would ascribe practically all the importance to the "highest functionaries
in the organism, in which the life-will appears as an active and formative
principle," and except in certain cases (where passive organisms alone are
concerned) would not give such a prominent place to the influence of
environment. Adaptation, according to him, is merely a secondary activity,
a mere re-activity, and he is therefore quite opposed to Spencer's
definition: "Life is the continuous adjustment of internal relations to
external relations." Again in the motive force behind animal and plant
life, Nietzsche disagrees with Darwin. He transforms the "Struggle for
Existence"--the passive and involuntary condition--into the "Struggle for
Power," which is active and creative, and much more in harmony with
Darwin's own view, given above, concerning the importance of the organism
itself. The change is one of such far-reaching importance that we cannot
dispose of it in a breath, as a mere play upon words. "Much is reckoned
higher than life itself by the living one." Nietzsche says that to speak
of the activity of life as a "struggle for existence," is to state the case
inadequately. He warns us not to confound Malthus with nature. There is
something more than this struggle between the organic beings on this earth;
want, which is supposed to bring this struggle about, is not so common as
is supposed; some other force must be operative. The Will to Power is this
force, "the instinct of self-preservation is only one of the indirect and
most frequent results thereof." A certain lack of acumen in psychological
questions and the condition of affairs in England at the time Darwin wrote,
may both, according to Nietzsche, have induced the renowned naturalist to
describe the forces of nature as he did in his "Origin of Species".
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