Many also who have had their bodies scourged with stripes have,
through resentment, either killed those who caused them to be
inflicted or conspired against them, even when they had kingly power,
as at Mitylene Megacles, joining with his friends, killed the
Penthelidee, who used to go about striking those they met with clubs.
Thus, in later times, Smendes killed Penthilus for whipping him and
dragging him away from his wife. Decamnichus also was the chief cause
of the conspiracy against Archelaus, for he urged others on: the
occasion of his resentment was his having delivered him to Euripides
the poet to be scourged; for Euripides was greatly offended with him
for having said something of the foulness of his breath. And many
others have been killed or conspired against on the same account. Fear
too is a cause which produces the same effects, as well in monarchies
as in other states: thus Artabanes conspired against Xerxes through
fear of punishment for having hanged Darius according to his orders,
whom he supposed he intended to pardon, as the order was given at
supper-time. Some kings also have been [1312a] dethroned and killed in
consequence of the contempt they were held in by the people; as some
one conspired against Sardanapalus, having seen him spinning with his
wife, if what is related of him is true, or if not of him, it may very
probably be true of some one else. Dion also conspired against
Dionysius the Younger, seeing his subjects desirous of a conspiracy,
and that he himself was always drunk: and even a man's friends will do
this if they despise him; for from the confidence he places in them,
they think that they shall not be found out. Those also who think they
shall gain his throne will conspire against a king through contempt;
for as they are powerful themselves, and despise the danger, on
account of their own strength, they will readily attempt it. Thus a
general at the head of his army will endeavour to dethrone the
monarch, as Cyrus did Astyages, despising both his manner of life and
his forces; his forces for want of action, his life for its
effeminacy: thus Suthes, the Thracian, who was general to Amadocus,
conspired against him. Sometimes more than one of these causes will
excite men to enter into conspiracies, as contempt and desire of gain;
as in the instance of Mithridates against Ariobarzanes. Those also who
are of a bold disposition, and have gained military honours amongst
kings, will of all others be most like to engage in sedition; for
strength and courage united inspire great bravery: whenever,
therefore, these join in one person, he will be very ready for
conspiracies, as he will easily conquer. Those who conspire against a
tyrant through love of glory and honour have a different motive in
view from what I have already mentioned; for, like all others who
embrace danger, they have only glory and honour in view, and think,
not as some do, of the wealth and pomp they may acquire, but engage in
this as they would in any other noble action, that they may be
illustrious and distinguished, and destroy a tyrant, not to succeed in
his tyranny, but to acquire renown. No doubt but the number of those
who act upon this principle is small, for we must suppose they regard
their own safety as nothing in case they should not succeed, and must
embrace the opinion of Dion (which few can do) when he made war upon
Dionysius with a very few troops; for he said, that let the advantage
he made be ever so little it would satisfy him to have gained it; and
that, should it be his lot to die the moment he had gained footing in
his country, he should think his death sufficiently glorious. A
tyranny also is exposed to the same destruction as all other states
are, from too powerful neighbours: for it is evident, that an
opposition of principles will make them desirous of subverting it; and
what they desire, all who can, do: and there is a principle of
opposition in one state to another, as a democracy against a tyranny,
as says Hesiod, "a potter against a potter;" for the extreme of a
democracy is a tyranny; a kingly power against an aristocracy, from
their different forms of government--for which reason the
Lacedaemonians destroyed many tyrannies; as did the Syracusians during
the prosperity of their state. Nor are they only destroyed from
without, but also from within, when those who have no share in the
power bring about a revolution, as happened to Gelon, and lately to
Dionysius; to the first, by means of Thrasybulus, the brother of
Hiero, who nattered Gelon's son, and induced him to lead a life of
pleasure, that he himself might govern; but the family joined together
and endeavoured to support the tyranny and expel Thrasybulus; but
those whom they made of their party seized the opportunity and
expelled the whole family. Dion made war against his relation
Dionysius, and being assisted by the people, first expelled and then
killed him. As there are two causes which chiefly induce men to
conspire against tyrants, hatred and contempt, one of these, namely
hatred, seems inseparable from them. Contempt also is often the cause
of their destruction: for though, for instance, those who raised
themselves to the supreme power generally preserved it; but those who
received it from them have, to speak truth, almost immediately all of
them lost it; for, falling into an effeminate way of life, they soon
grew despicable, and generally fell victims to conspiracies. Part of
their hatred may be very fitly ascribed to anger; for in some cases
this is their motive to action: for it is often a cause which impels
them to act more powerfully than hatred, and they proceed with greater
obstinacy against those whom they attack, as this passion is not under
the direction of reason. Many persons also indulge this passion
through contempt; which occasioned the fall of the Pisistratidae and
many others. But hatred is more powerful than anger; for anger is
accompanied with grief, which prevents the entrance of reason; but
hatred is free from it. In short, whatever causes may be assigned as
the destruction of a pure oligarchy unmixed with any other government
and an extreme democracy, the same may be applied to a tyranny; for
these are divided tyrannies.