SECOND EPILOGUE
10. CHAPTER X
 
Thus our conception of free will and inevitability gradually
 diminishes or increases according to the greater or lesser
 connection with the external world, the greater or lesser remoteness
 of time, and the greater or lesser dependence on the causes in
 relation to which we contemplate a man's life. 
So that if we examine the case of a man whose connection with the
 external world is well known, where the time between the action and
 its examination is great, and where the causes of the action are
 most accessible, we get the conception of a maximum of inevitability
 and a minimum of free will. If we examine a man little dependent on
 external conditions, whose action was performed very recently, and the
 causes of whose action are beyond our ken, we get the conception of
 a minimum of inevitability and a maximum of freedom. 
In neither case- however we may change our point of view, however
 plain we may make to ourselves the connection between the man and
 the external world, however inaccessible it may be to us, however long
 or short the period of time, however intelligible or
 incomprehensible the causes of the action may be- can we ever conceive
 either complete freedom or complete necessity. 
(1) To whatever degree we may imagine a man to be exempt from the
 influence of the external world, we never get a conception of
 freedom in space. Every human action is inevitably conditioned by what
 surrounds him and by his own body. I lift my arm and let it fall. My
 action seems to me free; but asking myself whether I could raise my
 arm in every direction, I see that I raised it in the direction in
 which there was least obstruction to that action either from things
 around me or from the construction of my own body. I chose one out
 of all the possible directions because in it there were fewest
 obstacles. For my action to be free it was necessary that it should
 encounter no obstacles. To conceive of a man being free we must
 imagine him outside space, which is evidently impossible. 
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